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ABSTRACT
At COP21 in Paris, governments reiterated the importance of ‘non-Party’ contributions,
placing big bets that the efforts of cities, regions, investors, companies, and other
social groups will help keep average global warming limited to well under 2°C.
However, there is little systematic knowledge concerning the performance of non-
state and subnational efforts. We established a database of 52 climate actions
launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York to assess output
performance – that is, the production of relevant outputs – to understand whether
they are likely to deliver social and environmental impacts. Moreover, we assess to
which extent climate actions are implemented across developed and developing
countries. We find that climate actions are starting to deliver, and output
performance after one year is higher than one might expect from previous
experiences with similar actions. However, differences exist between action areas:
resilience actions have yet to produce specific outputs, whereas energy and
industry actions perform above average. Furthermore, imbalances between
developing and developed countries persist. While many actions target low-income
and lower-middle-income economies, the implementation gap in these countries
remains greater. More efforts are necessary to mobilize and implement actions that
benefit the world’s most vulnerable people.
Policy relevance
Climate actions by non-state and subnational actors are an important complement to
the multilateral climate regime and the associated contributions made by national
governments. Although such actions hold much potential, we still know very little
about how they could deliver in practice. This article addresses this knowledge gap,
by showing how 52 climate actions announced at the UN Climate Summit in 2014
have performed thus far. Based on our analysis, we argue that the post-Paris action
agenda for non-state and subnational climate action should (1) find more effective
ways to incentivize private sector actors to engage in transnational climate
governance through actions that seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
promote climate resilience in a tangible manner; (2) identify factors underlying
effectiveness, to take appropriate measures to support underperforming climate
actions; and (3) address the large implementation gap of climate actions in
developing countries.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 7 June 2016
Accepted 9 October 2016
KEYWORDS
Climate policy; non-state
actors; Paris Agreement;
transnational governance;
UNFCCC
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Sander Chan sander.chan@die-gdi.de German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Tul-
penfeld 6, D-53113 Bonn, Germany; Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80115, 3508TC Utrecht, The
Netherlands
*Matthew Goldberg is currently a Grant Writer at BioLite, Brooklyn, New York, US.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1248343.
CLIMATE POLICY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1248343
1. Introduction
The new agreement reached at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in December 2015 represents significant progress in inter-
national climate cooperation (Falkner, 2016). Getting to a climate-resilient and low-carbon future, however, is
not just a matter for governments alone. With aggregated pledges by governments remaining far above path-
ways consistent with the global goal to limit warming below 2°C (Climate Action Tracker, 2015), additional
actions by a diverse range of non-state and subnational actors could help close the global mitigation gap
(Blok, Höhne, van der Leun, & Harrison, 2012). This potential was acknowledged in the COP decision accompa-
nying the new agreement, which recognizes ‘non-Party’ stakeholders, such as civil society organizations,
businesses, investors, cities, and regions, as key drivers of climate action, especially in the short term (prior to
2020), before the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contributions are implemented (Chan, Brandi, &
Bauer, 2016). However, it is still unclear to what extent reliance on non-state and subnational efforts is a
viable strategy to help bridge the global mitigation gap and to strengthen adaptation in the short term.
The many actions by non-state1 actors announced in the run-up to COP 21 suggest a true ‘groundswell’ of
climate actions. International organizations, in particular the UN system, have played an important role in bro-
kering new cooperative climate actions, and in enhancing their visibility to a larger audience (see also Hale &
Roger, 2014). In 2014, the UN Secretary-General convened a UN Climate Summit for leaders from government,
finance, business, and civil society, inviting them to launch new climate actions. At COP 20, the UNFCCC sec-
retariat, together with the Office of the UN Secretary-General, and the governments of France and Peru
formed the ‘Lima-Paris Action Agenda’, again inviting state and non-state stakeholders to collaborate on new
initiatives, resulting in 70 new climate actions. These actions are just a sample of the larger realm of transnational
climate action. For example, since its launch in December 2014, the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action
(NAZCA) platform has registered more than 11,500 climate actions, including not only pledges by individual
actors (e.g. companies and cities), but also a number of multi-stakeholder ‘cooperative initiatives’. The question
is whether these actions effectively reduce GHG emissions and help vulnerable communities and ecosystems
adapt to impacts of climate change. While this article does not address environmental and social impacts of
climate actions, it provides a first comprehensive2 analysis of actions launched at the 2014 UN Climate
Summit, with a particular focus on developing a better understanding of their output performance, and their
implementation across developed and developing countries. It asks two main questions, both addressed
through an output-based assessment. First, how have climate actions performed so far? Second, how is
implementation distributed across developing and developed countries?
With respect to the first question, any assessment of performance is conceptually and empirically challen-
ging. The effectiveness of environmental regimes, for instance, can be measured by compliance, environmental
and behavioural changes, or hypothetical counterfactuals (Andresen, 2013; Helm & Sprinz, 2000; Miles et al.,
2002; Mitchell, 2008). Similar choices exist for the assessment of non-state climate actions. Given the relative
novelty of most climate actions, an assessment of effectiveness in terms of actual environmental or behavioural
impacts is not possible. Instead, most studies on the effectiveness of climate actions focus on ex antemitigation
potential (Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership [CISL] & Ecofys, 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell
of Climate Actions, 2015; Graichen et al., 2016; Hsu, Moffat, Weinfurter, & Schwartz, 2015; Roelfsema, Harmsen,
Olivier, & Hof, 2015; UNEP, 2015; Widerberg & Pattberg, 2014). However, a mere focus on mitigation potential
may lead to unwarranted and overly optimistic estimations of climate actions, and evidence of ex post perform-
ance is necessary to evaluate how actions contribute to climate objectives in practice. This is especially the case
for the actions launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. Within the UNFCCC regime, these actions are seen as
part of ‘pre-2020 enhanced action’; they are expected to deliver results in a relatively short time frame. An early
indication of (potential) effectiveness is, therefore, desirable. Fortunately, climate actions can produce relevant
and tangible outputs relatively quickly, even when changes in environmental or social indicators are not yet
observable. The article therefore focuses on ‘output effectiveness’, that is, ‘outputs or regulations and infrastruc-
ture created to move a regime from paper to practice’ (Young, 2011, p. 19854). While output effectiveness does
not guarantee problem-solving, climate actions that deliver specific and relevant outputs are more likely to
achieve desired impacts in the longer term.
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For the second question, this article examines the geographic distribution of implementation, paying par-
ticular attention to imbalances between developed and developing countries. Current studies suggest that
non-state and subnational actions are concentrated in the global North (cf. Andonova, 2014; Bulkeley et al.,
2012, 2014; Chan, 2014; Hale, Roger, & Andonova, 2013). However, climate actions have the potential to
address needs in the global South (Chan & Hale, 2015), and in various respects, climate action in developing
countries can be considered more urgent. The growth in GHG emissions in the global South vastly outpaces
that in developed countries (e.g. from fossil fuel combustion and energy consumption; Energy Information
Administration [EIA], 2015). Moreover, developing countries have the least domestic means to shoulder the
costs of adaptation and mitigation, yet they are the first to face the impacts of climate change and the
highest adaptation costs (Baarsch et al., 2015). Going beyond studies that analyse where activities are
planned (Chan, Falkner, Goldberg, & van Asselt, 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions,
2015), this study analyses the actual geographic distribution of outputs by climate actions. A comparison
between planned and actual implementation allows for a better assessment of implementation gaps
across developing and developed countries.
The article draws on a large-n quantitative analysis, complemented by a survey and semi-structured inter-
views. The underlying database (‘Global Aggregator for Climate Action’ or GAFCA) contains data on organiz-
ational features, geographical patterns of implementation, and outputs of 52 climate actions.3 The data were
gathered from publicly available sources, including announcements at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, press
releases, and websites and platforms maintained by individual climate actions and their partner organizations.
This was complemented by a survey sent to representatives and focal points of individual actions to corroborate
and augment publicly available information. A total of 25 survey responses (out of 52) were received between 24
June and 30 September 2015. In addition, comments from focal points and experts were used to contextualize
the findings.
The article proceeds with a description of the 2014 UN Climate Summit and the sample of climate actions
launched there (Section 2), identifying organizational features, target-setting, and participatory patterns
within the sample. The third section presents an assessment of output performance. The fourth section presents
an analysis of geographic patterns of implementation. The article concludes with main findings and a discussion
of policy implications (Section 5).
2. The 2014 UN Climate Summit and its climate actions
The 2014 UN Climate Summit was the first UN summit dedicated to state and non-state climate action. UN
Secretary Ban Ki-moon invited leaders from national governments, local governments, business, investors,
civil society, and other social groups to ‘galvanize and catalyze climate action’, asking for ‘bold announce-
ments and actions (…) that will reduce emissions, [and] strengthen climate resilience’ (http://www.un.org/
climatechange/summit). While the summit was not part of the intergovernmental UNFCCC process, it
aimed to mobilize political will for ‘a meaningful legal agreement’ at COP 21. The summit was the first in a
series of attempts to align non-state and state actors outside or on the margins of the UNFCCC process.
Shortly after the 2014 UN Climate Summit, successive COP presidencies have presented 70 initiatives
under the ‘Lima-Paris Action Agenda’, and in June 2016, a ‘Global Climate Action Agenda’ was announced
by France and Morocco (Presidents of COP 21 and COP 22, respectively), with the aim to mobilize even
more initiatives (Chan et al., 2016). Arguably, large-scale mobilization of non-state and subnational actors
by UN agencies and collaborating governments has substantially influenced the Paris outcome (Jacobs,
2016). However, the mobilized actions themselves also have a great potential to reduce GHG emissions,
and to further enhance climate-resilient development (Hsu et al., 2015).
In total, 52 actions were launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. This sample is not necessarily represen-
tative of a very large and expanding universe of climate actions, but it is representative of a growing and increas-
ingly important subset of non-state and subnational actions mobilized by UN agencies and collaborating
governments. This sample features a high level of participation and leadership by the UN and other international
organizations, a wide range of objectives, and a broad variety in terms of target-setting. In the following, we
describe these key features.
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2.1. Participation and leadership
The strong backing of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon helped to elicit leadership by, and action among, UN
agencies (Pasztor, 2016); half of the UN Climate Summit actions are led by UN agencies and international organ-
izations. The active role of UN and international organizations indicates an eagerness to extend their limited
formal authority by mobilizing other actors to take on governance functions, playing an ‘orchestrating’ role,
and brokering initiatives involving public and private actors (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2015; Hale &
Roger, 2014). Considering the leading role of the UN in this sample, it may not be surprising that many of
the almost 1000 participants are international organizations (16%) and national government agencies (27%)
(Table 1). For all the emphasis on private actors at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, participation by businesses,
non-profits, and NGOs is remarkably low. Just over 10% of the almost 1000 participants in climate actions
belong to the business and industry community (including for-profit firms, corporations, small- and medium-
sized enterprises, state-owned enterprises, and business associations); another 10% are non-profit organizations
and NGOs. When research and education organizations are included, non-state actors make up just over a
quarter of all participants. If we add ‘other’ types of actors (15%), many of which are multi-stakeholder arrange-
ments that are difficult to categorize (e.g. hybrid networks that are listed as single actors), the proportion is
higher, but not more than about 40%. Also in terms of leadership – an important focus of the summit – the
role of private actors seems smaller than one would expect. Non-profits and NGOs lead 4%, and business
and industry actors 13% of climate actions.
2.2. Functional scope and target-setting
The scope of the actions launched at the UN Climate Summit is very broad. We categorized all actions, following
a close examination of self-declared objectives (Figure 1).4 Using a list of 12 functional categories, adapted from
a study of non-state actions in sustainable development (Pattberg, Biermann, Chan, & Mert, 2012), we find that
‘knowledge dissemination’ features most prominently, followed by functions that aim at supporting and
strengthening public policy, namely ‘policy planning’ (i.e. the production of policy plans and the development
of planning and policy instruments). While most existing studies primarily focus on the mitigation potential of
climate actions (Blok et al., 2012; CISL & Ecofys, 2015; Graichen et al., 2016; Roelfsema et al., 2015; UNEP, 2015),
few actions launched at the UN Climate Summit carry out functions that directly relate to mitigation, such as
technical ‘on-the-ground’ implementation (e.g. energy efficiency improvements of existing installations), or
the development of low-carbon products. To be sure, climate actions that do not directly set out to achieve
GHG emission reduction or adaptation could still have a significant indirect impact, for instance by influencing
awareness and behaviour. However, such indirect impacts may be difficult to attribute.
Similarly, diverse patterns of target-setting suggest that climate actions aim at a wide range of objectives
(Figure 2). Most quantitative targets5 set by climate initiatives do not relate to GHG emission reductions.
However, significant differences can be observed across the main action areas6 of the UN Climate Summit.
The majority of quantitative targets in the energy action area relate to mitigation. Most quantitative targets
set by resilience actions relate to mobilizing and distributing funding, and agriculture actions often aim at posi-
tively affecting a certain number of people.
The multiplicity of climate actions poses challenges for a comparative assessment. For instance, by what
benchmark should actions be assessed when objectives and target diverge so widely? Moreover, how can
Table 1. Participation by type of actor.
% of participants in climate actions % of lead partners in climate actions
National governments and agencies 27 8
International organizations 16 50
Subnational authorities 15 6
Business and industry organizations 11 13
Non-profits and NGOs 10 4
Research and educational organizations 5 6
Other 15 13
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impacts be attributed when most actions relate to mitigation only in an indirect way? Two additional factors
complicate a comparative assessment. First, lack of data transparency hampers an assessment of climate
action (Hsu, Cheng, Weinfurter, Xu, & Yick, 2016). Currently, only 44% of actions launched at the 2014 UN
Climate Summit have monitoring arrangements in place. Second, the relatively recent nature of the climate
actions in our sample places limitations on the assessment. While some actions were initiated before the
summit and have been operating for some years (for instance, the ‘Global Fuel Economy Initiative’ and the
‘en.lighten initiative – Lightening Efficiency Accelerator’), the large majority (81%) of actions were launched
in 2014 or later, which makes it difficult to compare actual performance across the full sample.
The next section introduces an output-based assessment method to effectively track the performance of this
novel and varied set of climate actions.
3. Output analysis of performance
To overcome the limitations placed on a large-scale, comparative assessment, our appraisal of effectiveness
focused on outputs, that is, tangible and attributable products of climate actions such as workshops, training
manuals, scientific publications, and infrastructure. Outputs do not reveal whether problem-solving has
occurred, nor do they necessarily result in desired changes. However, outputs are part of a longer chain of
effects; they are a precondition for achieving other forms of effectiveness. Because outputs precede behavioural
Figure 1. Functional focus of climate actions.
Figure 2. Types of quantitative targets.
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changes and environmental impacts, an output-based assessment can be conducted earlier than other assess-
ments. It is important to note that the functionalist logic of our assessment does not consider underlying
motives behind the creation of climate actions (for possible motives, see Green, 2013; Hoffmann, 2011).
However, assessing output performance remains an important first step. At a minimum, the absence of any
outputs would raise questions about whether climate actions are intended to solve environmental problems.
Our analysis of output performance follows Pattberg et al. (2012), who analysed partnerships for sustain-
able development launched at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. The method involves an
assessment of the ‘function-output fit’ (FOF), which measures whether climate actions produce outputs that
are consistent with their main functions. A versatile performance indicator, FOF can be applied across different
types of climate actions. The determination of FOF followed a three-step coding process. Throughout the
coding process, we carefully defined codes within the research team, held practice coding sessions, and
had subsets of actions coded by multiple coders to determine consistency and to ensure inter-coder
reliability. First, we inductively created 12 main functions (see Figure 1), and for every action we attributed
up to three functions (to accommodate the multifunctionality of many actions). Second, for every action
we collected data on outputs – the attributable and tangible products of climate actions. We identified 26
types of output, including events, publications, norms and standards, and physical installations. In a final
step, FOF is determined by indicating whether an action’s production is consistent with its function. For
instance, a climate action that aims to train civil society organizations could be expected to produce
outputs such as curricula or training materials, or training sessions. We distinguish four FOF values: ‘no
output’, ‘output but no functional fit’ (when outputs do not match functions), ‘partial FOF’ (when outputs
match with some, but not all functions), and ‘full FOF’. We assume that an action’s output should be consistent
with its functions to have its intended impacts. Subsequently, climate actions with a full FOF are more likely to
achieve intended impacts than actions with partial or no FOF.
Using this method, we find that after just over a year7 most climate actions produced outputs that fit some
(36%) or all (29%) of their main functions (Figure 3). This finding compares favourably with historical precedents.
For example, eight years after their presentation at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 43% of
partnerships for sustainable development still performed poorly, with many producing no output at all (Pattberg
et al., 2012).
However, we can observe significant differences in output performance across action areas. Climate actions
in the energy action area have a high score (nearly 90% full or partial FOF), while 71% of the resilience actions
have yet to produce outputs. Of the agriculture actions, 33% have yet to produce outputs and 52% have pro-
duced relevant outputs. The novelty of climate action is one factor. For instance, the vast majority of agricultural
and resilience actions were only launched in 2014, while two energy actions that show a high level of output
performance, the ‘Global Fuel Economy Initiative’ and the ‘en.lighten initiative’, were already operational
before the summit, and thus had a head start in producing outputs. But novelty does not explain the variation
in output performance between resilience and agriculture actions. Moreover, the relatively high performance of
energy actions may also relate to organizational capacity. The ‘Africa Clean Energy Corridor’ and the ‘SIDS Light-
houses Initiative’ benefited from being programmatically embedded in the International Renewable Energy
Agency; they did not require much time to set up autonomous organizational capacity before they produced
outputs.
Figure 3. Output performance by climate actions one year after their launch.
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A lack of output performance in a certain action area does not in itself suggest failure. Many actions may
simply take longer to deliver first results. Furthermore, a lack of output performance in the short term may
also indicate a high level of ambition from certain climate actions in areas where delivering outputs is difficult
and takes more sustained efforts. For instance, resilience actions had hardly been recognized in international
climate processes until the 2014 UN Climate Summit, and little experience exists with setting up actions in
this area (Dzebo & Stripple, 2015).
4. Output analysis of geography of implementation
Most climate actions in our sample have a broad geographic focus, aimed at impacts on a global scale. A pre-
dominantly global orientation is consistent with the intention of the 2014 UN Climate Summit to catalyse
climate action at a large scale. Despite having a broad geographic scope, the large majority of climate
actions that are not led by international organizations are coordinated by lead partners and secretariats
located in North America and Europe (75%). When most coordinating and leading partners in climate actions
are based in the global North (Bulkeley et al., 2014; Hsu et al., 2015), developing country-based actors do not
have the same influence to, for instance, define objectives; and benefits of climate actions may mostly
accrue to advanced economies. This lack of ownership is worrying, especially when most of the future
growth of GHG emissions, as well as the worst effects of climate change, are projected to take place in devel-
oping and emerging countries. Many of the ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ submitted by devel-
oping countries ahead of COP 21 indicated that additional means are necessary to meet mitigation and
adaptation targets. Climate actions may partly meet this need if they are successfully implemented in develop-
ing countries.
This section looks at where climate actions are being implemented. Specifically, it compares ‘reported
countries of implementation’, as declared by climate actions, and ‘actual countries of implementation’. To
this end, we devised a three-step strategy. First, the research team studied the announcements made at the
2014 UN Climate Summit, as well as the websites of individual climate actions, to determine the countries
where climate actions plan to undertake activities. This information was widely available, as the conference
organizers requested announcements to include information on where actions would take place. These data
thus concern self-reported countries of implementation. However, it cannot be ruled out that the number of
self-reported countries of implementation has been inflated. Proponents of climate actions may have been
inclined to count past activities that are not part of the future commitment presented at the 2014 UN
Climate Summit; activities may be planned but never realized; and impacts may be claimed that are not attribu-
table to an individual action. Geographic patterns of implementation solely based on self-reported countries of
implementation, therefore, may lead to an overestimation of the number of locations where activities are
implemented.
Therefore, in a second step, we identified where outputs (also used in the analysis of output performance) by
individual actions were produced. We did not include outputs that were not yet realized, making a strict distinc-
tion between what is planned and what has been realized. For every climate action, we determined the
countries in which outputs were produced, by analysing documentation, websites, and social media accounts
of climate actions. In doing so, we determined actual countries of implementation. We only specified actual
countries of implementation when outputs were attributable to a certain climate action. For instance, while
many cities have committed to carrying out activities under the Compact of Mayors, we only considered
cities that have set up a GHG inventory and/or defined at least one reduction target since signing up to this
climate action. Moreover, some outputs are not location-specific. For instance, an online information platform
could benefit actors in any location with Internet access. In these cases, we recorded the country of implemen-
tation as (1) the country where such an activity was launched and (2) the location of the implementing partner
(in that order). In a third and final step, we compared aggregate data on self-reported countries of implemen-
tation, with data on actual countries of implementation, to reveal any implementation gap between planned
and actual implementation across countries in different income groups, as defined by World Bank classification
(World Bank, 2016).
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Using this method, we find a relatively balanced distribution of self-reported countries of implementation.
Low-income and lower-middle-income economies account for nearly half of the reported countries of
implementation, with upper-middle-income economies and high-income countries accounting for 25% each.
Actions also target specific types of countries according to different needs and capacities: resilience and agri-
culture actions are predominantly implemented in low-income and lower-middle economies, while most indus-
try (mitigation) commitments focus on high-income or upper-middle-income economies (Figure 4).
Where climate actions plan to implement across developing and developed countries in a reasonably
balanced manner, actual implementation patterns suggest a stark imbalance: of the total number of locations
where outputs were produced, 40% were in high-income and OECD countries, only 17% of the locations were in
low-income countries, and 20% were in lower-middle-income countries (Figure 5). If we compare reported and
actual countries of implementation, the share of low- and lower-middle-income countries is much lower in the
latter. A possible explanation is that actions initially respond to needs in developing countries, but subsequently
run into problems or decide to implement in developed countries instead.
Current studies (Chan, Falkner, et al., 2015; Pattberg et al., 2012) and data platforms (such as NAZCA and
UNEP’s Climate Initiatives Platform) already indicate a lower number of non-state actions in developing
countries. Our analysis suggests that the level of activity by non-state actions in developing countries is even
lower if we take the production of outputs into account.
5. Conclusion and discussion
The 2014 UN Climate Summit was a milestone on the way to COP 21, not least because it built political momen-
tum and contributed to the creation of a positive ‘can-do’ narrative (Jacobs, 2016). The launch of 52 actions at
the summit, involving almost 1000 stakeholders, demonstrated that a growing number of actors are willing to
Figure 5. Reported and actual countries of implementation.
Figure 4. Implementation contexts by action area.
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take action on climate change. This article provides a first comprehensive analysis of these actions, with a focus
on developing a better understanding of their output performance and their implementation across developed
and developing countries. The analysis in this article leads to two main findings.
First, after just over one year, most climate actions have produced outputs that fit some or all of their main
functions. While this is an encouraging finding, output performance as such does not guarantee problem-
solving and environmental or behavioural impacts. More attention needs to be paid to high mitigation poten-
tial initiatives, such as the Global Investor Statement on Climate Change, the Aviation Action Statement, and
the New York Declaration on Forests. Statements and declarations may be an interesting political output, but
with little follow-up, they are unlikely to realize their potential in terms of raising funds, setting standards, or
reducing GHG emissions. Moreover, output performance varies considerably between the summit’s action
areas. Resilience actions, in particular, show a low level of output performance, while energy actions seem
much more effective. This may relate to the fact that resilience actions were only launched in 2014, while
some energy actions benefited from existing operations, or programmatic embedding in existing
organizations.
These findings raise questions that should be addressed in subsequent research. For instance, do resilience
actions simply need more time, or do they need to overcome more hurdles? Are relatively well-performing
actions simply repackaged, pre-existing initiatives, or have they been enhanced in the context of the 2014
UN Climate Summit? A more fundamental question relates to the factors that influence the effectiveness of
climate actions. While this question lies beyond the scope of this study, previous research has associated
higher levels of performance with financial resources and organizational capacity (Chan & Pauw, 2014; Galvaniz-
ing the Groundswell of Climate Actions, 2015; Widerberg & Pattberg, 2014). Our database, although limited by
the scarcity of publicly available information, offers a few insights. First, climate actions may be hampered by
underfunding. Of the 14 climate actions in our sample that aim at providing or raising funds, only 4 have actually
managed to raise or distribute funds, raising questions about whether the broader sample of actions will have
sufficient financial capacity. While greater capitalization can still be expected, persistent underfunding has
proven to be problematic in the past for many non-state actions. For instance, 65% of partnerships for sustain-
able development were still looking for funding four years after their launch at the 2002 World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development (Biermann, Chan, Mert, & Pattberg, 2007). Second, over half of the climate actions lack
dedicated staff and/or a secretariat. For a few actions that are programmatically embedded in larger organiz-
ational structures and networks, this may not be a problem; in other cases, climate actions may simply lack
the capacity to deliver on their promises.
Second, the article looked at where initiatives intended to implement their actions, and where they actually
implemented them. This study not only confirms North–South gaps in participation and leadership, but it also
suggests that the implementation gap in low-income and lower-middle-income countries is much wider than
that in high-income and OECD countries. While climate actions initially distributed their operations in a reason-
ably balanced manner across developing and developed countries, they seemed to run into greater problems
once they implement in developing countries. More research is necessary to understand why the implemen-
tation gap is wider in developing countries, and more efforts are necessary to support implementation in devel-
oping countries.
Finally, our analysis leads to some policy suggestions. There is a growing trend of UN and internationally led
efforts to align transnational governance with global public goals (Abbott et al., 2015; Abbott & Snidal, 2010;
Chan, van Asselt, et al., 2015; Hale, 2016; Hale & Roger, 2014). The 2014 UN Climate Summit was the first
large-scale attempt to link non-state actors with the international climate regime. Moreover, an increasing
number of initiatives by governments and international organizations recognize the potential non-state
actions. Efforts to realize synergies between the intergovernmental and transnational spheres of global
climate governance are especially opportune ahead of the 2018 facilitative dialogue, in which parties will
take stock of collective efforts towards the long-term climate goals, with a view to informing nationally deter-
mined contributions. In this context, climate actions could demonstrate solutions and inspire higher national
ambitions. The COP 21 decision builds on an action agenda which partly finds its origin in the 2014 UN
Climate Summit, by designating ‘high-level champions’ representing successive COP presidencies with overlap-
ping terms, to ensure better coordination and mobilization of an action-oriented agenda until 2020. Our
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research suggests that the post-Paris ‘Global Climate Action Agenda’ could step up efforts to mobilize non-state
and subnational actors by addressing the following:
. The Global Climate Action Agenda should address the implementation gap of climate actions in devel-
oping countries. Most efforts to orchestrate climate actions and demonstrate solutions happen at
large international meetings, mostly in developed countries. To better facilitate climate action in the
global South, efforts should also focus on non-state actors in certain countries and regions. For instance,
at international climate conferences, much emphasis is placed on climate actions by larger multinational
corporations. However, very few of them are based in developing countries; a focus on small- and
medium-sized enterprises may be more promising in these regional and national developing country
contexts.
. The Global Climate Action Agenda should promote greater data transparency of climate actions, especially
those featured in the NAZCA platform and in the UNFCCC process, to allow a better understanding of
their effectiveness, and their contributions over time. In the context of the UNFCCC, climate actions are
often highlighted as practical solutions, and good practices. However, valuable lessons can also be
learned from the failure of certain actions. A better understanding of factors underlying effectiveness is
necessary to improve climate actions. For instance, climate actions in the resilience action areas appear to
be underperforming. If the international community continues to focus on this action area, efforts are necess-
ary to better understand and improve them.
. Although the 2014 UN Climate Summit succeeded in engaging many stakeholders, participation by private
sector actors (business and NGOs) remains rather low. The Global Climate Action Agenda should find more
effective ways to incentivize private actors to engage in climate actions.
Notes
1. This article uses ‘non-state’ to denote a wide variety of actors that are not Party to the UNFCCC, including civil society organ-
izations, businesses, investors, cities, and regions – both individually and in cooperation with each other and with government
authorities.
2. Hsu et al. (2015), investigating the same sample of climate actions, primarily focused on a smaller subset of actions that mainly
addresses mitigation.
3. Based on the 29 ‘action statements’ and ‘commitments’ that were presented at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, we identified 52
individual climate actions.
4. To accommodate the multifunctional character of these actions, up to three of their most important functions were coded.
5. Just over half of all actions (54%) have set quantified targets. Well-defined targets have been associated with effectiveness;
they communicate a clear purpose and make it easier to track progress towards meeting them (e.g. Beisheim & Liese,
2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2014). While it is encouraging that many actions set quantitative targets, it is important to recog-
nize that it is difficult to define such targets for many types of climate actions. Measurable targets are particularly difficult to set
for ‘softer’ functional objectives, for instance, the dissemination of information.
6. The classification into ‘action areas’ follows the categories as defined by the organizers of the UN Climate Summit: agriculture,
cities, energy, financing, forests, industry, resilience, and transport. Our comparison between action areas focused on those
with most actions: energy, resilience, and agriculture.
7. Data on outputs in the database were updated until October 2015; the database was last updated in February 2016 to include
data on actual countries of implementation.
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